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ABSTRACT
This paper begins by presenting a case that models of behavioral 
intention do not provide insight into the core needs of human 
beings, and as such, cannot inform designers as to what types of 
ICT features and functions might help meet users’ ICT adoption 
rationale. We review various motivational concepts across 
different disciplines. We then present a theoretical model of 
motivation that encapsulates the process from primitive basic 
human needs, to the formation and attainment of a specific end-
state. We use a real life scenario to show the model’s explanatory 
power. We end by discussing potential implementations of this 
model into the study of ICTs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The labels Google Generation, e-Gen, Facebook Generation, 
Digital Generation, and Wired Generation represent the ubiquity, 
pervasiveness, and significance of information communication 
technology (ICT) use by youth and other populations in their daily
lives [12]. Yet, very little is known about the motivations for 
adoption of ICTs, including social ICTs. Motivation is the 
energizing force behind behavior intention [1]; it is the conscious 
or unconscious stimulus for action toward a desired goal, 
especially as resulting from psychological or social factors [25]. 
Clear understanding of motivations for adoption is important not
only for understanding the e-Gen phenomenon, but also to offer 
designers of social ICTs practical guidance as to how to construct 
ICTs that are desirable to use. 
The most widely used theoretical models for human behaviors, 
including ICT adoption, are the theory of reasoned action (TRA) 
[2, 10] and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) [1], as well as 
adaptations and variations built from their foundation. As we will 
demonstrate next, these models fall short in providing the 
explanatory power behind behavior to offer designers practical 
advice to build ICTs that individuals are motivated to adopt and 
use. 
TRA posits that behavioral intention is dependent on two factors: 
subjective norm and attitude toward the behavior [2, 10]. 
Subjective norm, Ajzen [1] notes, is “the likelihood that important 
referent individuals or groups approve or disapprove of 
performing a given behavior” (p. 195). Attitude is a behavioral 
belief held about a particular object that is linked to a particular 
outcome [10]. Ajzen [1] observes that a major limitation of TRA 
is its inability to predict “behaviors over which people have 
incomplete volitional control” (p. 181). As such, the theory of 
planned behavior (TPB) is conceived to address the judgments 
that one has as to how well he or she can engage in actions 
necessary for an enactment of a behavior. In other words, TPB 
adds control belief to the model of behavioral intention. Unlike 
subjective norm and attitude, perceived behavioral control, 
combined with behavioral intention, is a predictor of behavior 
itself. 
While both TRA and TPB use beliefs to predict the degree of 
intention to perform a behavior (or what Ajzen [1] refers to as 
motivation), they fail to capture elements of volitional behavior 
which are not bound up in beliefs, such as needs and desires. As 
Gollwitzer [11] notes, “being motivated’ implies a number of 
different phenomena” (p. 53) that begin with desires, and ends 
with evaluating the achieved action outcome. We will use the 
following scenario to illustrate the limitations of TRA and TPB.
Joe has recently moved from Italy to the United States to attend 
college, leaving behind his family, girlfriend and many close 
friends. It is rather expensive for him to call or send text messages 
to them regularly. Joe is considering joining the social networking 
web site Facebook, as many of those he would like to keep in 
touch with are members. They have often talked about how easy it 
is to join and use to connect with others. He has, however, had a 
negative experience with MySpace, another social networking 
site. He found the website interface clumsy and difficult to 
navigate, and as such, his interaction with his MySpace contacts 
was sporadic at best. As such, Joe is dubious about joining 
Facebook, but sees it as potentially the most viable approach to 
maintain desired relationships. 
Within the scope of TRA and TPB, knowing Joe’s beliefs is 
necessary to predict behavioral intention and behavior in regard to 
joining Facebook. While his behavioral beliefs are mixed 
(weighing negative experience against probability of successful 
interaction with friends and family), his normative beliefs are 
positive and strong (as he knows many existing members), as are 
his control beliefs (as he’s heard Facebook is easy to join and 
use). Hence, one could reasonably predict that Joe becomes a 
member. However, these beliefs do not capture innate needs and 
personal desires, which are at the core of volitional behavior. In 
other words, TRA and TBP do not explicitly address the core 
needs that may compel specific human activity. As such, an 
understanding of motivation, as a process that encapsulates needs 
as they are awoken into desires, ultimately forming intention to 
reach a goal-driven end state, begs for additional investigation. 
Such an understanding could offer designers of social ICTs, like 
Facebook, guidance into implementing designs that motivate 
individuals to adopt and/or use them. 
We now review the literature from a number of disciplines to 
unearth some fundamental concepts in motivation. Then we 
present a theoretical model of motivation that traces what we call 
primitive motives (those internal, fundamental biological and 
psychological human needs) from their root within individuals, 
ultimately to the attainment of a specific goal. We illustrate the 
practical value of the model in offering ICT developers insight as 
to how design elements might best meet human needs by directing 
their focus on the amplification of primitive motives to specific 
(or what we later refer to as objectified) motives, and how 
intention (in particular, goal intentions, which is also defined 
below) develops from such motives. 
2. OVERVIEW OF MOTIVATION 
CONCEPTS ACROSS SCHOLARLY 
LITERATURE
In order to gain a holistic understanding of the various 
phenomena that have been investigated, captured, and reported 
when studying motivation, we reviewed the literature in a set of 
diverse disciplines where human behaviors are of great interest: 
law, psychology, information systems (IS), human-computer 
interaction (HCI), and a few other branches of social science. 
Although we found inconsistencies in terminology use and 
emphases of investigations within and between disciplines, there 
is consistency on the existence of some important concepts. These 
are identified and summarized below.
2.1 Motives
The discipline of law provides some valuable insight regarding 
the concept of motive. Although this is not without confusion and 
interchangeable use between the terms motive and intent [3, 17], 
established distinctions are made by some. Binder [3] notes that 
following the utilitarianism philosophy which held that motives 
were purely desiderative states, and that intent was a cognitive 
state, inconsistent (and thus somewhat interchangeable) usage of 
the terms began in the 20th century. Arguments were made that a 
purely cognitive conceptualization of intent was incongruent with 
ordinary usage and actual legal usage. Such arguments were 
founded on the idea that intended consequences had to be those 
that were desired, and thus motive was not distinguishable from 
intent. Binder [3] explains that motive, in this line of reasoning, 
was “a kind of intent, one that was more distant or ulterior relative 
to some more immediate intent” (p. 46). 
Such an argument can be observed in the writings of Mercier [23].
He states that there are two parts to the definition of a crime, “the 
outward act, and the state of mind with accompanies it” (p. 3), and
clearly observes that motive is the part of this state of mind, being 
a series of desires, from primitive instincts to the specific desire 
for the action. As such, Mercier [23] expresses that motives are 
more distant intentions, and intentions are motives that are more 
proximate. The rationale behind this is that desires are interwoven 
with intent because the consequence of an intended act springs 
from one’s desire to perform the act. This line of reasoning in law 
suggests that desiderative states can be both primitive (and thus 
unconscious) and cognitive (and thus conscious).
From a psychological perspective, Gollwitzer [11] positions 
motivation as a process that involves numerous phenomena, and 
describes these in a model of phases, known as the Rubicon 
model [13-15]: action as a temporal, horizontal path that begins 
with motives, and ends with evaluating the achieved action 
outcome. He distinguishes these from wishes, implying that 
motives are basic, fundamental needs, and that wishes are desires 
that individuals are aware of. Winter et al. [29] explain that 
psychoanalytic tradition considers motives to be biological, 
fundamental drives, even though they use other terms such as 
desires and wishes synonymously. While there may be some 
degree of inconsistency in terminology, this does illustrate that 
psychology recognizes raw, unconscious human needs as an 
element of motivation. For example, Maslow [21], in discussing 
his hierarchy of needs, explained that primitive, unconscious 
needs are often at the root of desires that human beings are 
consciously aware of. 
Within the HCI framework of activity theory, Kaptelinin and 
Nardi [16] state that, “objects of activities are prospective 
outcomes that motivate and direct activities, around which 
activities are coordinated, and in which activities are crystallized 
in a final form when the activities are complete” (p. 66). They 
further explain that “objects can be physical (such as a bull’s eye 
on a target) or ideal (‘I want to become a brain surgeon’)” (p. 67). 
Objects of activities can also be referred to as objectives, giving 
meaning to what people do. They refer to the work of Leontiev 
[19], who asserted that needs are biological and/or psychological. 
As such, an unobjectified need is one that is a primitive state that 
does not have direction or purpose, while an objectified need is 
one that has purpose and requires an activity to fulfill.
Clearly, across these three disciplines, there is evidence to suggest 
that desiderative phenomenon, such as those captured in terms 
like “needs”, “desires”, and “wishes” can be categorized into 
those which are innate and primitive, and therefore unconscious; 
and those which individuals are aware of, and are about 
something. In law, Mercier [23], observes that action is the result 
of both primitive instincts and specific desires. This is reminiscent 
of the distinction Kaptelinin and Nardi [16] make in HCI between 
unobjectified needs and objectified needs. Those biological and 
psychological needs without objects (or goals) are those without 
direction, leading us to the conclusion that those which are 
objectified lead to intention. Likewise, in psychology, Gollwitzer 
[11] makes the distinction between motives and wishes, the 
former being desires that one is not aware of, and the latter being 
those that one is aware of.
Considering this point of general consistency, we have chosen to 
conceptualize two different types of motives in our model to 
maintain this distinction. We define the term primitive motive in 
our model as those unconscious needs that are most fundamental 
to human existence, which may be either biological or 
psychological.  Objectified motive, we define then, as consciously 
recognized desires (stemming from primitive motives) toward 
achievement (or avoidance) of a particular end. We adapt this 
term from activity theory [5] to refer to this need which has been 
given direction.  As Nardi [24] recognized that objects, as goals, 
are fundamentally rooted in context, we similarly see that it is 
context that amplifies primitive motives into objectified motives.
Similar to how Gollwitzer’s [11] describes wishes leading to goal 
intention, our model depicts an objectified motive leading to the 
same, consistent with the spirit of activity theory depicting an 
object giving direction toward a particular end [16]. As such, we 
now turn our attention to defining what intention is.
2.2 Intentions
In criminal law, Binder [3] provides a historical overview on how 
motive and intent came to be relevant to the judicial system. 
Motive first came to be distinguished from intent in the late 18th
century because courts were urged to distinguish between 
character and behavior. Motive was originally associated with 
character, while “intentions” were associated with behavior, 
which could then be compared to written rules of conduct. The 
utilitarian school of thought in the mid 19th century perceived 
motives as desiderative states, or as Binder [3] explains, “a desire 
or fear that causes action” (p.31), while intentions were described 
as cognitive states, or “expectations that accompany action” 
(p.31). Chiu [4], who equates motives with desires, observes that 
an act without a motive is one which is unintentional. Hence, 
under these arguments made by these law scholars, we can see 
that there is a distinction between two concepts. Of note, as the 
scholarly literature in law reviewed here seems to use the terms 
intent and intention interchangeably, we favor the term intention 
as it is more consistent with usage in other disciplines. 
The most widely-adopted and expanded model of usage in IS, the 
technology acceptance model (TAM) [7-9], is derived from 
TRA/TPB. As such, usage of these terms in both psychology and 
IS tends to be consistent. In writing about TPB, Ajzen [1] states
that “intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors 
that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard people 
are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to 
exert, in order to perform the behavior,” (p. 181). In Ajzen’s 
conceptualization, there is only one type of intention, behavioral 
intention, as behavior is what intention is directed toward. 
However, Gollwitzer [11] points out a different type of intention, 
that of goal intention. He explains that even with high desirability 
and feasibility, an individual needs to form determination in order 
to turn a wish (or what we call an objectified motive) into an 
intention. As he defines it, goal intention is the sense of 
obligation that an individual forms in order to reach the particular 
desired ends specified by the wish. Goal intention has similarly 
been called intent in law. For example, Mercier [23] and Kugler 
[18] spoke of intent as directed toward a particular goal. 
Behavioral intention, Gollwitzer [11] explains, proceeds goal 
intention, which he distinguishes as focusing on the behavior 
requisite for goal perusal. This is similar to the usage of intention 
that Ajzen [1] employs in that it is directed toward behavior. 
Thus, we find it prudent to define behavioral intention as 
commitment to a specific implementation course toward volitional 
goal achievement that includes how, when, and where to act, as 
well as limitations on duration and effort. 
2.3 Goals
As goal intention promotes the formation of a goal, and produces 
behavioral intention, it is important to address what a goal is. 
Much as the law literature inconsistently and interchangeably uses 
the terms motive and intent, the term goal is not well specified. 
Binder [3] often refers to intentions as goals, while Mercier [23]
refers to goals as the termination of a purposeful action. Kugler 
[18], meanwhile, refers to goals as the ultimate aim of motive. In 
the two latter cases, a goal is conceived of as some type of end 
state, either as the termination of an action, or as an ultimate aim. 
This fits in closely with the usage of goals in psychology and HCI.
Within psychology, Maslow [21] writes that goals are inseparable 
from motives, observing that goals are the ends toward which 
motives drive intention. From an HCI perspective, Nardi [24]
notes that, “the word goal in everyday English usage is generally 
something like what activity theorists call an object in that it 
connotes a higher-level motive” (p. 48). As Christiansen [5]
coined the term “objectified motive” as a way of denoting 
purpose, an object (as in objective) in this reasoning represents 
the goal, while an objectified motive is the driver of action toward 
this goal. This is similar to the psychology perspective of Locke 
and Latham [20] who define goal as the “object or aim of an 
action” (p. 175), serving to direct and energize actions and 
enforce persistence. In both disciplines, goals are essentially 
perceived as end states. As motive (specifically objectified 
motives) direct one’s attention toward goal intention, the goals 
that individuals strive to attain are therefore desired. As such, we 
define a goal as a desired end state. 
2.4 Behavior
While goal intentions form goals, as noted above, they also form 
behavioral intentions. Unlike other terms reviewed in this paper, 
the conceptualization and usage of behavior is essentially 
consistent throughout the disciplines reviewed in this paper. 
Writing from a psychological perspective, Coon [6] broadly 
defines behavior as anything that humans do, from sleeping, 
talking, sneezing, or thinking. He describes them as both activities 
and actions. In law, behavior is, in fact, the entire foundation of 
the discipline, as the purpose of law is to regulate (or guide) 
everyday behavior [22, 27]. As acts and actions are referred to as 
the outward, observable factors in law that determine culpability 
[3, 23], they are the core of behavior. Activity theory, which 
approaches behavior from an HCI perspective, sees behavior as 
the performance of activities through actions [24]. What these 
latter two perspectives capture, which the first does not, is 
behavior which is under an individual’s own control. However, 
Wehmeyer [28], who has a psychological perspective on behavior,
does use the term volitional for those behaviors which are 
purposeful “acts that enable the actor to cause things to happen in 
his or her life” (p. 115). 
As those behaviors which are meant for inclusion in our model are 
premeditated through behavioral intention, we assume that they 
are volitional and thus under the control of individuals. We also 
assume that as a goal intention has already been formed, that they 
are directed toward, and performed in expectation of, attainment 
of a particular goal. As such, we choose define behavior within 
our model as volitional actions directed toward goal attainment.
2.5 Summary of Literature Reviewed
Our review of the literature across law, psychology, and IS/HCI 
has led us to the distinction and definition of two types of motives 
and two types of intentions, as well as a clear conceptualization of 
behaviors and goals. As the concepts we identified are influenced 
from motives, through intentions, to the performance of behavior, 
and ultimately goal attainment, a process emerges. Thus, we adopt 
the term motivation, to signify this process that encapsulates 
motives, intentions, behaviors, and goals. 
3. THE MOTIVATION MODEL 
Consistent with the scholarly literature above, we consider 
motivation to be a process. Our model is designed to depict the 
internal process mechanisms that lead to observable, motivated 
behaviors. By deconstructing motivation into such a detailed 
process, we hope to identify elements that can lead to informed 
ICT design decisions. Figure 1 illustrates our model, while an 
explanation of the model follows. 
Primitive 
Motive
Objectified 
Motive
Behavioral 
Intention
Behavior Goal
Goal 
Intention
Figure 1. A Motivation Model of ICT Adoption and Use
Our model begins with primitive motives, conceived of as 
biological or psychological needs that are fundamental to
existence. These are context-free desires, common and inherently 
preprogrammed into the human organism. Objectified motives are 
consciously recognized specific desires which direct attention 
toward a particular goal. 
Primitive motives are transformed into objectified motives 
through the influence of contextual factors that make an 
individual aware of a need. As desires that are consciously 
recognized, if an objective motive has high enough desirability 
and feasibility, a goal intention is formed. This is the sense of 
obligation an individual creates for him or herself toward reaching 
that desire specified by the objectified motive. A goal intention 
specifies a goal, an end state which represents the fulfillment of 
the specific desire, and leads to behavioral intention. This is 
defined as commitment to a specific implementation course 
toward the desired goal, consisting of when, where, and how to 
act, including limitations on effort and duration. The behavioral 
intention directs the behavior that the individual engages in, 
which is conceived of as those volitional actions which are 
performed toward attainment of the specified goal.
4. APPLYING THE MOTIVATION MODEL 
To illustrate how our model may have implications for ICT design 
and use, we turn to the scenario introduced earlier in order to
identify the various constructs and their relationships.
Per our scenario, Joe has the objectified motive of wishing to keep 
in touch with those he left behind in Italy. Yet, unlike existing
models that predict or explain behavior, such as TRA and TBP [1, 
2, 10], our model allows us to look back one step further. In other 
words, what primitive motives give form to this objectified 
motive? One which is evident is that of relatedness [26, 30], a 
common, basic need to maintain social connections. With the 
context of Joe being away from his family and friends in Italy, his
primitive motive of relatedness becomes amplified into his 
objectified motive, a conscious wish to keep in touch with them. 
Of note, we do recognize that this could be looked at as multiple 
(albeit similar) objectified motives, such as Joe wishing to keep in 
touch with family, Joe wishing to maintain a relationship with his 
girlfriend, and Joe wishing to continue to interact with friends on 
some level. For the sake of parsimony, and as all three of these 
objectified motives can fit into the attainment of a single goal, we 
choose to refer to it as a single motive.
An objectified motive can be turned into a goal intention if 
desirability is strong enough, and if it is feasible enough. In Joe’s 
case, despite having reservations about joining another social ICT 
website, if his desirability to keep in touch with family and friends 
is strong enough, a goal intention will form. This goal intention 
will be a sense of obligation for Joe to join Facebook, while also 
making him aware that joining Facebook is a goal he must work 
toward. It is this sense of recognition, of having an unattained 
goal, which spawns Joe’s behavioral intention to join, consisting 
of a particular course of action that involves the what, where, and 
how, as well as the effort he will put into it. For example, his 
behavioral intention to join Facebook may consist of logging into 
his computer at home tomorrow evening after class, and filling 
out the requisite online forms. Of note, behavioral intention does 
not necessarily mean that the behavior will occur. Joe may 
accidentally fall down stairs on his way home and break his leg, 
delaying his behavior. He may get a call from his girlfriend 
breaking-up with him, which may cause him to abandon his plan. 
Or there may be a power outage in the dorm that causes Joe to 
adapt his strategy and join from another computer at another time. 
In this way, behavioral intention is a plan that may not necessarily 
comes to fruition, but does serve to further direct attention toward 
a goal.
The behavior Joe performs may or may not match up exactly with 
that expected within his behavioral intention, based on 
unexpected influences noted above. However, going forward in 
the process of motivation, Joe engages in behavior that allows him 
to reach his goal. The enactment of behavior that is geared toward 
the goal is a result of behavioral intention, even if outside forces 
have intervened. As our example above stated, if Joe has intention 
to join Facebook from his door room at a specified time, but his 
power goes out then, the behavior he performs by logging into his 
iPhone and joining Facebook from there, is still a product of his 
original behavioral intention, even though the actual behavior is 
slightly different. The process of motivation still continues 
unbroken in our model. However, if Joe’s girlfriend breaks up 
with him, and causes him to abandon his intention, we would say 
that the process of motivation has ended. If the goal is attained, 
we would say that the process of motivation, in regard to this 
particular objective, has allowed Joe to reach his desired end state. 
Looking backward we can see that this end state originated from 
Joe’s primitive motives, and was the energizing force that carried 
him through to the attainment of his goal. 
Our motivational model is, in this way, stronger than that of TRA 
and TPB in that designers of ICTs recognize that goal attainment
(for example adoption or use) is a product of fixed, and common 
primitive needs. TRA and TPB fail to consider such human 
biological and psychological needs as drivers toward behavior. As 
primitive motives are amplified into objectified motives within a 
particular context or by particular activity (as Nardi [24] sees 
context and objects as mutually influencing one another), 
designers of social ICTs might look at how to design contexts that 
invoke this amplification. For example, if Facebook was to 
include a romantic, match-making feature that the designers 
wanted users to adopt, they might subtly put single users in a 
context that makes them aware of their needs. Designers may 
tweak the interface to bold users’ relationship statuses of “single”, 
or even write a script that embeds pictures of singles that are using
the app onto the side of other singles’ windows. Similarly, to 
promote a higher degree of usage, designers may want to add new 
communication features such as video chat or the ability to 
exchange files, as these might cause users to feel more socially 
connected. In other words, by creating contexts that makes one 
aware of wishes to fulfill psychological or biological needs, 
adoption and use might be increased.
5. CONCLUSION 
As Hardey [12] noted that adoption of social ICTs is a popular 
enough phenomenon to garner a number of different generational 
labels for its constituents, understanding the motivational factors 
involved is necessary to not only explain why, but also to give 
practical guidance to designers who wish to maximize adoption 
and use for a given social purpose. In this paper, we reviewed 
literature that spans disciplines such as law, information systems, 
psychology, and human-computer interaction to formulate a 
holistic understanding of what motivation entails. We then 
developed a model that depicts various, distinct stages of the 
motivation process. Such deconstruction of motivation allows 
designers to emphasize certain elements of the model to inform 
design of desirable ICTs. We used a social ICT (Facebook) to 
illustrate the main concepts and relationships bound within our 
model. However, we want to emphasize that it can be applied to 
other types of ICTs.
There are many potential future research directions. Our model is 
the first step toward filling the gap in existing theoretical work to
explain human behaviors in the ICT context. Certainly, there is a
need for further refinement and empirical validation. The 
formation of objectified motives, goal intention, and behavioral 
intentions within given contexts are worth further investigation in 
order for the model to be of value to designers. Additionally, 
identifying how specific features and affordances of social ICTs 
allow adopters to meet their goals, and thus human needs, is
potentially another very influential direction for research that may 
ultimately influence ICT design. 
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